12.7.2025 84th Pearl Harbor Remembrance

That's a great place to go right.

Father, Rob Novich will deliver the invocation.

Please join me in prayer.

Lord God, our heavenly father, we are gathered here today on this historic battleship to commemorate those among your servants who gave their lives at Pearl Harbor, December 7th, 1941, 84 years ago today. A day that has lived in infamy. We currently sit just a few yards away from the Brager Bridge honoring the sacrifice of Navy Yman Secondass Charles M. Brager Jr. of our city who gave his life in service of our

country at Pearl.

Lord, not everything that happens in the world reflects your goodness and grace.

You have given us freedom to choose and with that freedom sometimes some choose to do evil. Today we recall a time of great evil in our world remembering the Second World War. We also remember those who stood up against that evil who fought on so many battlefields as well as here at home to ensure that evil would not prevail. We thank you that in the hour of need, you gave men and women

the strength and resolve to stand for whatever the cost. We remember, honor, and cherish all those who gave their lives at Pearl Harbor. And because of their dedication to duty, we continue to enjoy the freedoms we inherited from our forefathers.

You have declared greater love, as no one has, than this, than to lay down one's life for one's friends. May we be willing to follow their example when duty calls. We pay tribute to their ultimate sacrifice for our liberty for the good of our American nation and the fight for peace in the world. We ask that in their footsteps we may continue in your service till your summons comes.

Then in the knowledge that we have striven to observe your commands and by serving you our country and fellow brothers and sisters, we may be united with them with you forever. Amen.

Thank you, Father Rob.

Good morning, everyone. Welcome to Battleships Cove. Battleship Cove's annual Pearl Harbor Day ceremony where we remember the 2,43 men, women, and children killed during the Air and Sea attack by the Imperial Japanese Navy at our base in Hawaii. I want to extend special thanks to Dr. Stanley Carpenter, our guest speaker. The family of Joseph Satollah, a crew member of the USS Phoenix, a cruiser that was one of the

first ships to get underway under the after the attack. Their father's memorabilia is on the port side which you may view after the ceremony. Our USS Massachusetts living history group who likewise has an exhibit over there with um bios on the Massachusetts citizens who were service people who were killed during the attack or after the attack.

Our clergy, Father Rob Nekov Nepovich and Father Mike Rine and Battleship Cove staff. I'd also like to acknowledge any gold staff families that may be present here. Our guest speaker is Dr. Stanley DM Carpenter.

Dr. Carpenter is Emirator's professor of strategy and policy at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He retired in 2020 after 22 years and served as strategy and policy department head in the college of distance education where he taught and administered the strategy and war non-resident programs and served as the naval war college command historian. He holds degrees from Florida State

University, University of St. Andrews, and University of North Carolina.

After 30 years of service, he retired from the US Navy in 2009 with a rank of captain, having served three commanding officer tours, and in several senior staff post.

He researches and publishes extensively on the British Civil Wars, the American Revolution and War of American independence, American and British military and naval history, military leadership, and the two 20th century world wars. He is also the author of several historical fiction, action, adventure novels. Professor Carpenter has taught three has taught diverse subjects ranging from ancient Greek

civilization and Roman Empire to the War of American independence to modern era conflicts for several universities in online graduate history and diplomacy programs. He lectures extensively at public libraries and historical associations throughout the Northeast, New York, the Carolas, Virginia, and the United Kingdom. Most recently, he serves as a resident historian on board Viking ocean cruise line ships in the

Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic, and Baltic, as well as tour historian for Steven Ambrose Historical Tours and is the former Naval Order of the United States historian general. Welcome, Dr.

Carpenter.

So, it is a pleasure and an honor to be here today uh 7 December 1941 as we honor those who gave the ultimate sacrifice on that day. And what I want to do uh is essentially talk about missed indicators and unlikely probabilities. Uh, when I looked at this, what do I really want to emphasize? I think most people here probably have a general idea of the Pearl Harbor uh episode, but I wanted to

home in on something that uh I like to stress, and that is the value of intelligence and intelligence analysis and guessing what the enemy may be all about. So unfortunately for the United States Navy, Marine Corps sailors, airmen in Aahu on that morning of 7 December 1941, it was really a great surprise. And so I want to basically unfold that story. But before I do that, I want to talk a

little bit about a prelude here, meaning what were the Japanese up to? So in 1941 uh Japan was intent on taking what they call the southern resource area and that's basically modern Indonesia, New Guinea, that area because primarily they were running out of oil. We had in fact embargoed oil and iron and several other industrial materials. So this was the prelude to the war. Japan plans for war.

But in order to do that, they had to keep the United States from becoming engaged. They had to keep a watch on the Soviet Union. They had to win that war in China that they had initiated back in the 1930s.

And they had to isolate that theater essentially from any interference on the part of the United States and and also from Great Britain. Remember the British Empire uh was pretty substantial there.

For example, Singapore uh was a major naval and air station there for the British Empire. In other other words, they had to neutralize any possibility of the United States interfering and that meant neutralizing the United States Pacific Fleet now based at Pearl Harbor Hawaii.

Well, there was not agreement among the high command in Japan. For example, there is Admiral Osami Nagano. He was the chief of the naval general staff. Uh that more or less equates to our chief of naval operations today. In other words, the uh head of the the staff and also uh the administrative head of the Navy. Well, Admiral Nagono and the naval staff were focused essentially on that

attack in what they call the southern resource area and they did not agree with what became the operation uh Hawaii. That was the brainchild of this gentleman, Admiral Isuroku Yamamoto.

Uh his official title was commander-in-chief combined fleet. So he was essentially the operational commander and he probably was the most powerful of all the Navy admirals.

And interesting about Admiral Yamamoto, he opposed attacking the United States.

Uh he had in his junior officer years actually served a tour in Washington as Japanese naval attaches. He also did a couple of years at Harvard on a what we'd call a fellowship. And so he more than probably any other leading Japanese uh military or naval person understood America. He also understood the industrial capability of the United States. And so he argued that to attack the United States uh was actual folly.

But like a good military man when the orders came down, okay, you have got to do this. Come up with a plan. Uh interesting that he did comment and these are words to that effect. Uh I can run wild for six months. Then what? So he understood that if you were going to attack the United States, particularly the Pacific fleet, you had to do it quickly. You had to knock them out

quickly in order to give Japan enough time to consolidate their defensive line and make their gains in the southern resource area. Uh so uh once the decision is made, how do we go about this? And that's going to come about as the Operation Hawaii plan. Well, a little bit about the Imperial Japanese Navy. They had at the time the best most robust carrier air uh capability in the world and their airmen were the best

naval aviators in the world for a lot of reasons. Um and they had organized their carriers into what was known as the ketoai or the mobile force and British and American thinking at in the day was that the aircraft carrier is the adjunct to the heavy battleship line. Uh in other words, aircraft will provide reconnaissance and spotting, gunfire spotting, scouting, that sort of thing.

Well, Japan essentially said, "No, this is our major striking arm." And so they organized six aircraft carriers into what was known as the Kido Batai. Well, the commander of that was going to be this gentleman, Chuichi Nagamo. He was a battleship sailor. He didn't really believe in the plan. He thought you you come to grips with the US battleship line, uh, battleship to battleship. But

nonetheless by the Japanese system which was s strictly by seniority he was given command of the keto batai. Fortunately for him he had this gentleman commander uh minor genda and he was an aviator and he was an ace planner. He's actually the main officer responsible for uh operation Hawaii.

So let me go through very quickly the six aircraft carriers just show you a photograph. There's the Akagi, the flagship, the Keto Betai. There's the Kaga, the carrier Shakoku and Zuikaku. These were fairly new. In fact, they had just been launched in the summer and autumn of 1941. So, these were brand new, very large fleet carriers.

Then you had a couple of slightly smaller ones that dated from the late 1930s, the Heru and the Soyu. So there are your six aircraft carriers that Japan had combined together into this mobile strike force or kitai.

So if you look at the forces available Pacific fleet versus the Japanese combined fleet uh you'll notice that in terms of carrier aircraft we were outnumbered roughly 2 to1 in other aircraft same thing. aircraft carriers in the Pacific 10 to three battleships that on down smaller vessels. It was more or less uh the same. Uh but you can see if Japan is going to use aircraft carrier power, air power as the major

offensive striking force, you can see the advantage they're going to go into the war with. So the idea is to in a quick decisive hopefully strike knock out the capability of the United States Pacific Fleet in Hawaii as well as Army Air. Army Air is going to be very important. I think uh people sort of underrate that and don't realize it wasn't just an attack on the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was an attack on the

Army, particularly the Army Air Forces in Aahu. So what about the folks there and what about the missed indicators and the unlikely probabilities? Well, there is the unfortunate Admiral Husband E.

Kimmel, uh, commander-in-chief Pacific Fleet, who assumed command in early 1941.

He also was a battleship sailor uh, and he relied upon his staff for uh, recommendations and for uh, for air sorts of things. Here was the problem.

Everyone believed in Washington and in Hawaii that war was coming. I mean, the indicators were clearly there. The intelligence indicators were clearly there. But everyone assumed it's going to start in that southern resource area or what then was called the Far East, what we would call today East Asia.

Well, well, that's true. The Japanese are going to attack that the same day.

the Philippines particularly and that of course was guaranteed to bring the United States into the war because the Philippine Islands that time were uh a protectorate sort of situation for the United States and um that was the expectation and in fact on the 28th of November there was the famous uh war message that basically said war is coming within the next few days. But again, everybody in Pearl Harbor and in

Washington fully believed that that the U Japanese were going to attack, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia, that area, but that Pearl Harbor was relatively safe just because of the the distance and the difficulty of getting a battle force there.

So the main fleet had gone to Pearl Harbor from the east coast uh sorry west coast mainly San Diego, San Francisco that area had been moved out the year before. So think of it as a sort of forward operating base and it had been under development Pearl Harbor in particular as a uh Navy operating base since the first part of the century.

Well, the battleships are going to be mored at uh battleship row. I don't think you can actually well this is not going to the pointer is not going to work but you can see in the picture there that island in the middle of the harbor that's known as Ford Island and that was used by the army for an airfield and also navy scouting uh scouting aircraft but you see the battleships mored alongside there uh

other parts of the Pearl Harbor installation the submarine base uh and of course the extensive shipyard. So that is what Pearl Harbor looked at the time. One of the uh problems that's going to occur here in terms of missing this was the aerial reconnaissance. Now there was actually pretty vibrant uh robust air reconnaissance availability.

And there you see some of the aircraft that were available to both the army and the navy. Uh, and if you look at some of those distances, it might be a little hard for you folks in the back, but the PBY Catalina Navy uh, maritime scouting aircraft. Look at that. Out to 750 miles. She had very long legs. So, the air uh, capability there to detect an incoming Japanese force was there if it

had been used the way it should have.

There you see some photographs of some of those aircraft that were based on Aahu for uh long range scouting.

Here was part of the problem. There is Lieutenant General Walter Short, United States Army. He was CEO of the Hawaiian Department. He had been also appointed to command in early 1941.

uh he believed that the greatest threat to the army aircraft was not an attack by Japanese forces rather it was sabotage because about a third of the island of Aahu were ethnic Japanese.

These are folks that had been brought in over the previous 50 or 60 years mainly uh to work the uh the plantations pineapple and and other uh fruits and vegetables. Uh so there was a substantial Japanese community. Not that any of them were going to do anything, but think how easy it would be for a sabotur to be landed and to basically integrate into the community uh and then sabotage the aircraft. So what General

Short did is he ordered all the aircraft brought into the center of the airfields and lined up wing tip to wing tip which in the Navy we call that a target of opportunity or a targetrich environment.

Um and this is going to be a a major contributor to how many army aircraft are actually destroyed literally in the center of the field. Now, one of the real controversies that has always raged is over the use of radar. Uh the army had implemented um this the SCR2270 Bravo radar. Uh it was based on the British model. The uh the Royal Air Force had used this very successfully the year before in the battle of

Britain, but the US Army was just now coming online with these more or less portable um radar installations. Um, and the famous story is the two privates that were manning the Opana Point radar uh picked up a large formation of aircraft coming ground from the north.

So, the radar did what it should do, the two operators did what they should do.

But because they had not really developed the uh procedures and protocols, it's 0700 time to shut down.

And just as they were shutting down, one of the two operators said, "Wait, wait, wait. Here's something coming in. Large formation of aircraft coming down from the north." Well, of course, what he had spotted was the Keto Betatai Strike Force. So, they called it into the uh the just stood up command center down at uh Fort Shater. And the officer on duty was Lieutenant Kermit Tyler.

And this was uh a command center that had just been set up. There were no real procedures. There was no real doctrine.

And Lieutenant Tyler was a fighter pilot. And this was his very first watch in the command center with no training.

Well, hey, you know, it's Sunday, junior officer. Guess who gets the duty? So when the call came in, he made the famous statement, "Don't worry about it."

Well, I do a lot of speaking at Pearl Harbor every five years at the the symposium there and uh at the 65th in 2006. U then retired Colonel Tyler was there and I asked him about this and he sort of chuckled and said, "Well, here's the real story." At the time he was dating the sister of one of the B17 pilots that were due to fly in from Hamiltonfield, California that morning.

So in his mind when they reported we sir we have a large formation of aircraft coming down from the north. Aha that's the B7 flight coming in. Don't worry about it. So in reality this was only 7:00. Uh the first actual bombs to drop uh were on Kaneoi Naval Air Station about 7:48.

The first attack at Pearl Harbor itself 755. So even if he had taken this a different way and started calling up the chain of command, there's no way you could have mobilized the the defenses.

So an interesting story, but that's the reality. So let's look at that day and what happened. One of the things Japan did very cleverly was sail the northern route. Now this is December, northern Pacific, very stormy. merchant ships avoided and Japan was able to sail the key to Bhutai and not even be detected at all and they reached the drop point or the takeoff point uh early in the morning of 7 December.

353 aircraft launched in two waves roughly an hour apart. Um, one of the other reasons why we assumed, well, you there's no way you can do it air attack on Pearl Harbor because it's too shallow. It's only about 40t deep.

And the average uh draft of one of these battleships is 33 feet. Uh, and a torpedo at the time, you launch it, airdrop, it goes right down for about 50 or 60 feet, then it bobs up to its preset depth of say 15, 20 feet, whatever you're setting it for. So the assumption was, well, these things, if they drop them by air, they'll just simply dive right into the mud of Pearl

Harbor. Well, what Japan had done is they had come up with a a a flexible uh wooden fin set that actually caused these torpedoes to go down a few feet and then bob right up. This was the reason why the battleships did not have anti- torpedo nets laid out, which of course would have stopped it.

Uh so there is Naval Station Pearl Harbor as it looked on the morning of 7 December. Uh and you can see the the battleships lined up there on Battleship Row. Interesting little sidlight. We actually fired the first shot that morning. First casualties of Pearl Harbor were two Japanese sailors in a mini sub. And that has to do with USS Ward. She was on patrol in what was known as a submarine exclusion area,

which was outside the mouth of Pearl Harbor.

Any submarine spotted in there was to be taken as hostile and attacked. So, the ward opened fire on this mini sub that they spotted trying to sneak in behind a fleet tub tug because what you do is you lower the net at the harbor entrance to allow a ship to come in. So as the fleet tug Antares was moving in, they the ward spotted this conning tower of a Japanese mini sub following in her wake. They

opened fire. 3-in round fired by one of the guns. Uh the sailors, the gunner's mates claimed, "Yep, we hit it." For many, many years this, uh, you know, they're just a bunch of Navy reservists from Minneapolis. What do they know?

Well, when this sub was discovered on the bottom back in the I believe the 1990s, sure enough, here's a 3-in hole in the conning tower. That gun, by the way, has been on display for many, many years outside the used to be called the Navy Reserve Center. Now it's the operational command uh support center in uh St. Paul, Minnesota. That gun is still there. Uh so the first round was fired. Well, of course, the ward

reported this, but again, well, n I mean, just uh they're just a bunch of Navy reservists. They don't know what they're talking about. Well, they did.

And so, the first shot fired by the u the United States, the first casualties taken, USS Ward. So, let me wrap up very quickly.

There is a famous picture taken from a Japanese aircraft. Uh, and if you look very carefully, you can see the water spout. I think that's outside USS Oklahoma, which was u one of the ships that suffered a great deal of casualties. Um, but that is a very early on in the first minutes or so of the attack. But that is a a famous photograph. Now, there were more casualties than just simply the

battleships along battleship row. There you see USS Shaw, a destroyer. She was actually in the dry dock area and you see that explosion. Interestingly enough, the Shaw was repaired and put back into action which I find singularly stunning because you can imagine the uh amount of damage there when the magazine ammo magazine blew up and literally blew the first half of the ship away.

There is one of the most famous photographs from Pearl Harbor. That is the explosion that doomed USS Arizona.

And the story here was an Army medical officer who just happened to be transiting on a ship or a boat across Pearl Harbor and just happened to have his uh camera and was filming for some reason and he caught this. So that is the actual explosion as the bomb from a Japanese highle bomber went through the the deck of USS Arizona and exploded in a uh in a magazine of sorts. That is

what happened and over,00 of our shipmates are still interoured in USS USS Arizona. Now we did get some strikes in. Uh there is uh Wheeler Field. That was where the Army Airore fighters were primarily based. Uh Lieutenants Welch and Taylor actually got airborne and did some damage. But by and large the attack was successful except Admiral Nagamo got cold feet. Uh the uh original plan was

to do a third attack, a third wave to go after the submarine base, the repair facilities and in particular the fuel storage depot. Uh but Admiral Agamo said, "Nope, we've done our job. We have crippled the Pacific US Pacific Fleet.

Time to go home before we suffer any damage." And so Pearl Harbor was very quickly put back into action um there shortly thereafter. So one of the things I want to do here uh very quickly and I'm going to hand these uh these are some visuals. Uh I would like them back afterwards, but if you'll uh pass them around. So I'll just start them right here.

And I think you'll find these quite interesting on the Oklahoma and the Arizona. So again, it has been a pleasure and an honor to speak with you today and to provide a little bit of insight into what happened on the morning of 7 December 1941. And again, remember the the theme here.

There were many indicators potentially from intelligence, from other sources that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. But the decision makers, the key decision makers in Pearl Harbor or Hawaii itself and Washington DC all discounted that there's no way this is going to attack. And so as the Kubai flew in, they met no opposition. There was no air cover because AD uh General Short had actually chosen this weekend

for a complete standown for maintenance, repair, and crew rest. So, as the Kidai flew in over uh Hawaii, the only aircraft in the air was a civilian aircraft uh student pilot flying it. And so, Lieutenant Commander Mitsui Fushida, who was the strike commander, signaled back by radio to the fleet, to the mobile force the famous words to tora, which in Japanese means uh tiger, tiger, tiger. And that was the code word

that said we have achieved complete surprise.

And so with that, just a couple of announcements. Uh afterwards I will be next door in uh the wardroom. I have a number of books actually my my latest set of books and if anybody's interested uh I'll be there available to sign those and also if you have any questions uh if you would come over there and see me after the ceremonies here and I'll be happy to answer any questions. So thank you very much.

Those of you who are able, please stand.

I'd ask the Living History Group to deliver the wreath to the podium.

Such cool.

Please remain standing while Father Mike Rein delivers the benediction.

As we commemorate this 84th anniversary, a sad day in American history, the words of President Roosevelt were echoed. A day that will live in infamy.

As we gather this day, we remember the shock of an infamous, unprovoked attack.

But we also remember the coverage of this great nation that always stands to its cherished values.

On this anniversary, we continue to honor the brave Americans who gave their lives and those who stood in our defense.

As we have echoed those words today, there is no greater love than to lay down one's life for a friend.

These victims, these heroes lived and died these words.

As we look back, we look also forward and ask your grace and guidance for continued peace on our country and safety on those who continue to serve in our branches of military.

Guide and protect them and bring them home safely. And we commend to you, Almighty God, those who have lost their lives.

In this season of hope, the joy and the peace and the light that we remember the words of the prophet Isaiah.

Amen.